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The Meaning of the "Unnecessary Rigor" Provision in 
the Utah Constitution 
James G. McLaren* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be 
imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons 
arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 1 
Since 1986, three criminal appellants have attempted to raise issues 
under the "unnecessary rigor" provision of the Utah Constitution. Each 
case involved sentencing. In two cases, the court handled the issue under 
the "cruel and unusual punishment" provisions of the state and Federal 
Constitutions. The third case was argued solely in terms of the 
unnecessary rigor provision, which the court decided was not violated. 
These cases raised questions about the meaning of the unnecessary rigor 
provision and the types of issues that would be appropriate to address 
under the provision. This Article explores possible answers to these 
questions by examining the Utah constitutional convention, the historical 
context within which the unnecessary rigor provision was adopted, and 
the case law of states with similar provisions. 
II. ORIGIN: SCARCITY OF CLEAR INTENT 
At the Utah constitutional convention of 1895, the only record of 
debate on the unnecessary rigor provision was as follows: 
The Secretary read section 9 . . . . 
Mr. VARIAN. I don't know what the purpose of that last phrase 
or clause is. It seems to me it is a matter of legislation. The section 
as it stands prior to that, "excessive bail shall not be required; excessive 
fines shall not be imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishment be 
inflicted," seems to cover the whole ground. I don't want to raise any 
* Copyright <C 1996 by James G. McLaren. Scottish H.N.C. 1977, Glasgow College; 
B.A. 1985, M.A. 1986, J.D. 1989, Brigham Young University; M.Phil in Law 1996, Leicester 
University, England. As the thespians say, the author is currently "resting." 
1. UTAH CONST. art. I,§ 9 (emphasis added). 
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unnecessary question, and I suggest to the chairman of the committee 
whether there is any particular reason for putting that in there. 
Mr. WELLS. The object [is] to protect persons in jail if they shall 
be treated inhumanely while they are in prison. 
Mr. THURMAN. I would like to ask the chairman of that 
committee if this is copied from any other constitution? 
Mr. WELLS. I will answer the gentleman that I don't think it is, 
in the language, but there are plenty of provisions in regard to the 
humane treatment of prisoners. 
Mr. THURMAN. I don't think we ought to adopt this unless it is 
copied from some other constitution; for that reason I shall favor the 
motion to strike out. 
The motion to strike out was agreed to. 2 
Apparently, the unnecessary rigor provision was intended to be 
dropped from article I, or perhaps was dropped and later reinserted. In 
any event, voting on the Utah Bill of Rights as a whole, the delegates 
passed article I, section 9 with the unnecessary rigor provision on three 
separate occasions. 3 The proceedings are silent as to the change of heart 
that occurred sometime between the March 21, 1895 debate and the first 
vote on the adoption of the "declaration of rights" on April 3. 
The Utah Supreme Court did not have occasion to cite the unneces-
sary rigor provision until 1929. In Davis v. Walton, 4 Walton appealed 
the district court's affirmation of the prison warden's order that Walton 
be asexualized. The warden had petitioned under an act providing "for 
the asexualization of persons afflicted with habitual sexual criminal 
tendencies, insanity, idiocy, imbecility, feeble-mindedness, and epilepsy, 
who are confined in the Utah state hospital and sanitorium, the state 
industrial school, and the state prison. "5 The act required that the 
petitioner believe that the asexualization be in the best interests of the 
inmate and of society. 6 
Walton contended that the order was "contrary to, and in violation 
of, article I, [section] 9 of the Constitution of Utah, in that it provide[ d) 
for the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. "7 The court disposed 
of the issue under the cruel and unusual punishment provision, citing to 
2. I PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1895, at 257-58 (1898). 
3. See vote on declaration of rights, id. at 650; vote on adoption of the constitution as 
a whole, II PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1895, at 1834 (1898); 
vote on the final adoption of the constitution, id. at 1850. 
4. 276 P. 921 (Utah 1929). 
5. !d. at 922 (citing 1925 Utah Laws 159). 
6. 1925 Utah Laws 159. 
7. Davis, 276 P. at 922. 
27] UNNECESSARY RIGOR PROVISION 29 
a Washington case8 which held that an operation for the prevention of 
procreation was "not contrary to or in violation of the Constitution of the 
State of Washington which prohibited cruel punishment. "9 The Utah 
court found that the act permitting asexualization was "in no sense a 
penal statute. The operation provided for is not a punishment for a 
crime. Its purposes are eugenic and therapeutic. Therefore [appellant's] 
cases dealing with laws that provide for asexualization as a punishment 
for [a] crime are not applicable to the law here under consideration. " 10 
The court did not analyze the issue under the unnecessary rigor 
provision. The appellant probably raised the issue only as one of cruel 
and unusual punishment. In sweeping aside all other potential bases for 
a claim of unconstitutionality, the court stated: 
The state, of necessity, is charged with the proper care of inmates 
confined in public institutions. If the welfare of an inmate of a public 
institution demands an operation, we know of no constitutional 
provision, either state or federal, that prohibits the legislative branch of 
the government from directing that such operation be performed without 
the consent or against the will of such inmate. 11 
The issue in Davis was not one of punishment but rather one 
concerning "the proper care of inmates in public institutions," and could 
have been briefed and disposed of under the unnecessary rigor provision. 
The provision applies to "[p ]ersons arrested or imprisoned," and 
concerns their treatment, which, according to the constitutional conven-
tion debate, should not be "inhumane." 
III. RECENT UTAH CASES: SEARCHING FOR MEANING 
In State v. Bishop, 12 the appellant, Bishop, challenged the constitu-
tionality of the minimum mandatory sentencing scheme. Bishop 
contended that because he was ineligible for immediate participation in 
the sex offenders program, which was only available three years prior to 
his release, his minimum mandatory sentence of five years constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment under both state and federal constitu-
tions.13 
Bishop did not address the unnecessary rigor provision in his brief. 
Instead, his arguments were confined to the cruel and unusual punishment 
8. State v. Feilen, 126 P. 75 (Wash. 1912). 
9. Davis, 276 P. at 923. 
10. !d. 
11. !d. at 924. 
12. 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986). 
13. /d.at267. 
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provision14 because the relevant issue was solely whether a sentence 
prescribed by statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 
However, in section V of the opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by Chief 
Justice Hall and Justice Howe, used the unnecessary rigor provision of 
the state constitution to contrast article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitu-
tion with the Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution: 
We have not heretofore defined the meaning of the Utah Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause of Article I, section 9. However, it is plain 
on the face of Article I, section 9 that the Utah provision is broader 
than its federal counterpart. Section 9 states: 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 
Except for punctuation and insignificant stylistic changes, the Utah 
provision tracks the federal provision exactly, except for the last 
sentence of section 9. Of course, we are free in appropriate circum-
stances to give the Utah provision a broader interpretation. That is 
even suggested by the last sentence of section 9, which states: "Persons 
arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor." 
That state constitutional guarantee has no counterpart in the Eighth 
Amendment. We need not in this case fully explicate the content and 
limitations of section 9; that is a task better done on a case-by-case 
basis. Nevertheless, we note that the last sentence of the Utah cruel 
and unusual punishment provision contained in section 9 is broader than 
the comparable federal provision. For present purposes, we need only 
hold that the Utah and the federal cruel and unusual punishment 
provisions apply to this case in the same fashion. To determine how 
they apply, we look primarily to federal case law. 
We hold that the cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the 
State and Federal Constitutions do not prevent the State from incarcerat-
ing the defendant for a term longer than the time required to complete 
the state prison's sex offenders program. 15 
Justice Durham, concurring in the result and joined by Justice 
Zimmerman, disagreed with the treatment given to the state constitutional 
provision: 
Section V contains neither an exploration of the distinct content and 
meaning of the federal and state provisions regarding cruel and unusual 
punishment nor a reasoned conclusion that no distinctions exist. An 
14. See Brief for Appellant at 14-15, Brief for Respondent at 4-5, State v. Bishop, 717 
P.2d 261 (Utah 1986) (Nos. 19733, 19797, 19847) (1228 SUPREME COURT OF UTAH BRIEFS). 
15. Bishop, 717 P.2d at 267. 
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examination of the briefs discloses that no attempt was made by counsel 
to illumine the state constitutional law questions beyond mechanical 
reliance on federal precedents. Under those circumstances, we should 
either require supplemental briefing, give the questions full treatment 
sua sponte, or decline to treat them all; but in any event we should be 
clear and explicit about the course we undertake in developing 
principles of state constitutional law. Otherwise, we abdicate our 
responsibility to articulate the meaning of our own constitutional 
provisions and simply "march lock-step with interpretation given to . 
the United States Constitution." 16 
31 
This encouragement to brief separately on state constitutional claims, 
coupled with the majority's mention of the unnecessary rigor provision 
in a sentencing context, prompted a separate unnecessary rigor claim in 
State v. Russell. 17 
Russell was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and aggravated 
kidnapping which he had committed when he was fifteen. He was 
sentenced to a fifteen year minimum mandatory sentence with a five year 
enhancement for using a firearm. He contended that his sentence, 
imposed after he was certified as an adult, constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment. In addition, citing State v. Bishop, he contended that his 
sentence violated the unnecessary rigor provision: 
As an offender under the age of sixteen, the minimum mandatory 
sentence applied to Mr. Russell is disproportionate to his level of 
culpability. The sentence is applied with unnecessary rigor when 
imposed upon a juvenile this age and fails to take into account the 
distinct roles of retribution and deterrence as well as increased 
possibilities for rehabilitation where an offender is fifteen years old 
rather than an adult. 18 
At oral argument, the State disagreed with Russell's characterization 
of the unnecessary rigor provision as one dealing with the proportionality 
of sentencing. The State thought that the provision spoke only to the 
terms of confinement, but could offer no further explanation under 
questioning from Justice Stewart. 19 Justice Durham offered this thought 
from the bench: 
16. Bishop, 717 P.2d at 272 (quoting State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983) 
(Shea, 1., dissenting)). Justice Durham stated that "This question has apparently never been 
addressed by this Court, although the structure ofthe opinion in Davis v. Walton suggests that 
the state and federal provisions do require separate analysis." !d. at 272, n.1 (citation omitted). 
17. 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990). 
18. Brief for Appellant at 16, State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990) (No. 880172). 
19. Oral Argument at 907-12, State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990) (No. 880172) 
(tape #1, January 1990). 
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I had always thought . . . that the second sentence of the provision 
which says that "Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor" might embody an entirely separate notion, 
having been written in an historic time when forced labor, convict 
labor, and pretty primitive prison conditions were not unknown both in 
this state and other parts of the country, and that it really had to do with 
the personal treatment that an individual prisoner received while in the 
custody of the state or the authorities. 20 
The appellant, Russell, rebutted this interpretation, claiming that the 
history of the clause (meaning, perhaps, the lack of history) supported 
neither Justice Durham's interpretation nor one encompassing proportion-
ality of sentence. The source of the clause was "not known. " 21 
Justice Howe, writing for a unanimous court, disposed of the issue 
as follows: 
Defendant also argues that his sentences violate[] article I, section 9 of 
the Utah Constitution on the basis that broader protection is afforded by 
its provision that "[p]ersons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor." While we indicated in State v. Bishop that 
section 9 was arguably broader than its federal counterpart, we 
nevertheless stated that its content and limitations were best explicated 
on a case by case basis. As we examine the facts of this case, we do 
not find that the concurrent fifteen-year minimum mandatory sentences 
are unnecessarily rigorous. The crimes and defendant's manner of 
committing them were severe and shocking; he had an extensive 
juvenile criminal record of violent crimes; and all attempts at rehabilita-
tion in the juvenile system had failed. Strong corrective measures were 
justified. 22 
In State v. Deli, 23 the defendant had been sentenced to consecutive 
prison terms in accordance with Utah statutes for two counts of criminal 
homicide, murder in the second degree, attempted criminal homicide, 
aggravated arson, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated 
robbery, theft, and aggravated assault. He received seven firearm 
enhancement penalties. Deli relied on language in Russell and Bishop, 
asserting that Utah's section 9 was broader than its federal counterpart. 
Deli interpreted the court's determination to explicate section 9 "on a 
case by case basis "24 as an invitation to defendants to bring complaints 
20. /d. at 1067-1135. 
21. /d. 
22. State v. Russell, 791 P.2d at 190-91 (citation omitted). 
23. 861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993). 
24. Russell, 791 P.2d at 190-91. 
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under the unnecessary rigor provision of excessive sentencing that would 
not prevail in a cruel and unusual punishment argument. The prosecution 
fairly characterized the defendant's argument as follows: 
Defendant has not challenged any of [the trial court's specific findings 
which support the consecutive sentences]; the only argument he raises 
to support his claim that he was treated with unnecessary rigor is that 
the victims, police, and prosecution were dissatisfied with the jury 
verdicts of second degree murder instead of capital murder. 25 
Justice Hall disposed of the issue as Justice Howe had done in 
Russell, noting that the sentences were consistent with statutory guidelines 
and that the trial court had taken into account, among other things, the 
senselessness and brutality of the murders, lack of compassion, and risk 
to society if the defendant were released from prison. 26 
The court's language in Russell and Deli indicating that a "sentence 
was not unnecessarily rigorous" has created confusion. Even if the 
drafters of the Utah Constitution had contemplated sentencing in the 
unnecessary rigor clause of section 9, all sentencing arguments are now 
comprehensively dealt with under the cruel and unusual punishment 
provision. 27 
Only sentencing arguments have been presented to the Utah Supreme 
Court under the unnecessary rigor clause. However, the court apparently 
prefers to deal with such arguments under the cruel and unusual 
punishment provision. If presented with an argument on sentencing that 
relies solely on the unnecessary rigor provision, the court will decide, 
with a minimum of dicta, that the sentence does not typically violate the 
provision. An examination of the case law so far reveals the current 
standing of the unnecessary rigor provision: 
1. It relates to the prevention of inhumane treatment of 
prisoners; 
2. It may or may not relate to the proportionality of sentenc-
ing; 
3. The supreme court will interpret the clause when the 
appropriate case is presented; and 
4. It is unclear what an appropriate case would be. 
25. Brief for Respondent at 10, Brief for Appellant at 8-10, State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431 
(Utah 1993) (No. 910306). 
26. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d at435; cf Russell, 791 P.2d at 191 (defendant's crimes and 
"manner of committing them were severe and shocking"). 
27. In 1895 cruel and unusual punishment was not thought to include sentencing. See 
infra note 34. 
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The court has expressed its willingness in both Bishop and Russell to 
independently interpret the unnecessary rigor provision. However, until 
the provision is "subjected to the kind of briefing and analysis that is 
helpful to the development of doctrine and precedent, "28 the court will 
be justifiably reticent to expound the meaning of the provision. In order 
to help practitioners brief and analyze the provision, this Article now 
suggests two possible approaches: historical context and comparison with 
other states. 
IV. HIS'IDRICAL CONTEXT 
Justice Durham has suggested that Utah's unnecessary rigor provision 
relates to the personal treatment received by prisoners, since it was 
written when forced labor, convict labor, and poor prison conditions were 
prevalent. 29 This section examines the validity of this suggestion by 
comparing federal and state attitudes toward prisoners during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and by analyzing the territorial 
laws and constitutional provisions which were the forerunners to Utah's 
unnecessary rigor provision. 
A. Federal Hands-Off Doctrine 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." In the nineteenth century, 
"scholars and jurists ... traditionally interpreted [the Eighth] [A]mend-
ment merely to prohibit certain forms of punishment. "30 The Eighth 
Amendment was regarded by courts as the embodiment of the rejection 
of Old World barbarism rather than the creation of rights yet to be 
defined. In 1878, the United States Supreme Court, expounding upon 
permissible modes of capital punishment in Wilkerson v. Utah, 31 used 
examples from England where "the King" or "the humanity of the nation 
by tacit consent" mitigated cruel and painful punishments; as a result, 
emboweling alive, beheading, quartering, and burning alive "were seldom 
strictly carried into effect. "32 As one federal court stated, there was 
"[n]o doubt [that the] delegates to the conventions, in providing against 
cruel punishment, had largely in mind" the prohibition of these and other 
28. Christine M. Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah Courts, UTAH 
BAR J., Nov. 1989, at 25, 26. 
29. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
30. Note, The Role of the Eighth Amendment in Prison Reform, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 647, 
649 (1971). 
31. 99 U.S. 130 (1878). 
32. /d. at 135. 
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atrocities. 33 It was not until 1910 that the United States Supreme Court 
extended the meaning of the Eighth Amendment to prohibit disproportion-
ate sentences. 34 
The protection of the Eighth Amendment did not extend to prisons, 
where "the traditional role of the judiciary was ... merely to interpret 
statutes and to review a narrow range of administrative actions. "35 The 
"absence of effective judicial intervention" in correctional matters "has 
been attributed both to the procedural limitations associated with the most 
common forms of action utilized by inmate-plaintiffs -[habeas corpus 
and others]- and to the judiciary's philosophic commitment to the 
'hands-off' doctrine. "36 This doctrine, which persisted37 into the mid-
1960s, provided that courts were "without power to supervise prison 
administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or regula-
tions. "38 Thus courts would deny "jurisdiction over the subject matter 
33. Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413,417 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd, Berry v. Davis 242 U.S. 
468 (1917); see Note, supra note 30, at 649 n.18. Whether this was the sole concern of the 
framers, or whether they also sought to prohibit excessive or disproportionate punishment, has 
been a matter of debate. See Arthur B. Berger, Note, Wilson v. Seiter: An Unsatisfying 
Attempt at Resolving the Imbroglio of Eighth Amendment Prisoners' Rights Standards, 1992 
UTAH L. REV. 565, 569-70 & nn.25-28. 
34. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), extended the protection of the Eighth 
Amendment to sentencing. The Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment was 
not made obligatory on the states until Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). While 
mindful of Weems, Utah courts prior to 1962 did not regard excessive sentencing as cruel and 
unusual punishment, which was "ordinarily thought of in terms of the thumbscrew, the rack, 
burning at the stake, nailing one's tongue to a post, crucifixion, disembowelment, beheading, 
quartering, public dissection and the like .... " Chapman v. Graham, 270 P.2d 821, 822 
(Utah 1954). 
35. Note, supra note 30, at 654. 
36. !d. at 655. The phrase "hands-off doctrine [is] taken from Fritch, Civil Rights of 
Federal Prison Inmates 31 (1961)." Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial 
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L. J. 506, 506 n.4 (1963). 
37. This persistence has not been without some exceptions, however. "A few courts ... 
either expressly or by implication rejected the hands-off doctrine." Note, supra note 36, at 
507; see, e.g., Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) ("A prisoner retains all 
of the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken 
from him by law."); United States ex ref. Yaris v. Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp. 143, 144 
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) (Courts "will interfere if the treatment of prisoners amounts to [the] 
deprivation of [their] constitutional rights."); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) 
(crime cannot be punished by deprivation of federal citizenship). While these courts recognized 
that prisoners had rights, generally, the obligation "to define and enforce the prisoner's rights 
... was not met." Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. 
L. REV. 985, 987 (1962). For a discussion of the evolving standards used by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Eighth Amendment cases, see Berger, supra note 33; Melvin Gutterman, 
Prison Objectives and Human Dignity: Reaching a Mutual Accommodation, 1992 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 857. 
38. Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954). 
This position was "held with virtual unanimity by the courts." See Note, supra note 36, at 508 
& n.12. 
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of petitions from prisoners alleging some form of mistreatment or 
contesting some deprivation undergone during imprisonment. "39 
B. State and Territorial Prison Conditions 
State prisoners in the nineteenth century fared no better. They were 
not regarded as having "rights" in the modern sense of the word. While 
"due process" existed in state criminal trials, "it was carefully bounded, 
and showed little propensity to expand. Outside the courtroom were 
zones of power and immunity: the Army, schools, factories, prisons, 
poorhouses, and institutions of all sizes and sorts. "40 The United States 
Supreme Court held in 1833 that the Federal Bill of Rights was not a 
limitation upon the states;41 however, state courts of the period were 
reluctant to use "state constitutions to prevent infringement of core . . . 
liberties, "42 which prisoners were deemed to have forfeited anyway. 
The Virginia Supreme Court expressed the prevailing view: "He [the 
convicted felon] has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his 
liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its 
humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the 
State. "43 Friedman illustrates with an example from Pennsylvania: 
[A prisoner] refused to go to religious services on Sunday. He was 
punished by the keeper, who put him in the dungeon. Afterwards, a 
deputy warden forced him to "attend the religious exercises." The 
court derisively rejected any claim that rights had been violated. The 
court looked at the prison as the locus of a private sphere of authority, 
and the warden's power was likened to a parent's control over 
children. 44 
In the mid and late nineteenth century, the majority of states 
"expended tremendous political energy on making, unmaking, and 
remaking constitutions. "45 The Utah Constitution is said to be represen-
39. Note, supra note 36, at 506. 
40. Lawrence M. Friedman, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice in the Late 
Nineteenth Century, 53 ALB. L. REV. 265, 274 (1989) (emphasis added). The state courts 
were said to have "uniformly adopted" the hands-off doctrine. See Note, supra note 36, at 508 
n.l2 (citing cases from Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, and Pennsylvania). 
41. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
42. Suzanna Sherry, The Early Virginia Tradition of Extra-Textual Interpretation, 53 
ALB. L. REV. 297 (1989). 
43. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790,796 (1871), quoted in Note, supra 
note 37, at 985. 
44. Friedman, supra note 40, at 274 (citing Merrick v. Lewis, 22 Pa. D. 55, 55-56 
(1912)). 
45. /d. at 266, (citing MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 11-14 (1977)); see also John]. Flynn, Federalism and Viable 
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tative of an "era of popular mistrust and hostility toward government" in 
Utah. 46 It could be postulated that the outburst of "unnecessary rigor" 
and other prisoner protection clauses in these remade constitutions was 
partly a manifestation of this mistrust. However, the paucity of cases 
enforcing prisoners' rights and the fact that some states did not enforce 
these rights until 1965 belie any notion of popular sentiment toward 
inmates. For example, Georgia, despite its constitutional prohibitions 
against abuse of prisoners, was notorious in the 1940s and 1950s for 
"treat[ing] chain gang prisoners with persistent and deliberate brutali-
ty, "47 and for failing "signally in its duty as one of the sovereign [s]tates 
of the United States to treat a convict with decency and humanity. "48 
As Justice Durham suggested, such maltreatment of prisoners was 
not uncommon in the late nineteenth century. In Utah, the desire to 
eliminate brutality and to ensure decent and humane treatment for 
convicts may have been the catalyst of the unnecessary rigor provision. 
C. The Mormon Dimension 
In Utah, "[e]arly officials of the territorial prison were Mor-
mons. "49 They believed that the convicts should work, in part because 
they abhorred idleness and considered work a privilege, and in part 
because "a hard working convict would be more interested in sleep and 
rest at night than escaping .... "50 The system of contracting out 
prisoners was practiced in Utah from 1860 until 1888, when it was ruled 
illegal. 51 Prisoners were "sold" to their employers for the term of their 
sentences. "The conditions of the contract were of such nature that the 
employer was to feed, clothe, guard and meet all charges incurred in the 
execution of the convict's sentence and to pay the warden the amount set 
forth in the agreement. "52 In addition, convicts sentenced to hard labor 
were used in making prison improvements, quarrying, mining, territorial 
roadworking, logging, farming, making saddle cinches and other 
State Government - The History of Utah's Constitution, 10 UTAH L. REv. 311, 314 (1966). 
46. Flynn, supra note 46, at 314. 
47. See Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250,253 (3d Cir.) rev'dpercuriamonother grounds, 
338 U.S. 864 (1949) (proof of mistreatment was made partly by articles from magazines of 
national circulation), cited in Note, supra note 37, at 1005. 
48. Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d at 256. 
49. James B. Hill, History of Utah State Prison 1850-1952, at 4 (1952) (unpublished 
M.S. thesis, Brigham Young University). 
50. /d. at 72. The practice of fully employing prisoners continued into statehood, with 
the warden reporting in 1898 that every prisoner had been employed for the previous two 
years. See Warden's Report, Document 19, in 1898 STATE OF UTAH PUB. Docs. 
51. Hill, supra note 49, at 4. 
52. ld. at 79. 
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laborious jobs. 53 This treatment of prisoners in Utah was reported to be 
humane. 54 
The territorial prison, however, was described by the legislative 
assembly in 1864 as "almost totally unfit for the purposes for which it 
[was] designed. "55 The walls were in decay and the cells were unsafe 
and unhealthy. Conditions had not improved by the late 1880s and early 
1890s. Bunks in cell houses were built three high. The cells were seven 
feet high, seven feet long, and five feet wide. An iron cage called the 
"sweat box" was used to discipline prisoners and the inmates' water "was 
often muddy and unfit to drink. "56 
These conditions were perhaps not exceptional for the era. In Utah, 
however, the situation was complicated by the imprisonment of Mormon 
church leaders for practicing polygamy. 57 "During the 1880's upwards 
of a thousand men were sent to the Utah State Penitentiary for failure to 
discard their wives and families. Hundreds were driven into hiding and 
thousands were disenfranchised. Women were also sent to prison for 
failure to testify against their husbands. "58 Male prisoners "were 
shaved of their beards and dressed in stripes,59 [and] were hardly 
recognized by their own wives and . . . children . . . . "60 The peniten-
tiary became over-populated, "filled mostly with Mormons convicted on 
charges of polygamy. "61 Until 1889, Mormons perceived that federal 
53. Governor's Message, in 1899 STATE OF UTAH Pus. Docs. 26; see Hill, supra note 
50, at 72. 
54. Prisoners were "not worked to death" and no criminals died in prison from 1855 to 
1878. As part of their humane treatment they had access to a library and had a school. Hill, 
supra note 50, at 4, 7. 
55. Hill, supra note 49, at 47. 
56. !d. at 55-56. 
57. The term polygamy is used generally to include the two separate offenses of 
polygamy and unlawful cohabitation. Most prosecutions involving Mormons were for unlawful 
cohabitation, rather than polygamy. An unlawful cohabitation prosecution could proceed on 
evidence of cohabitation with more than one woman, using community reputation. See Thomas 
G. Alexander, The Odyssey of a Latter-Day Prophet: Wilford Woodruff and the Manifesto of 
1890, 17 J. MORMON HIST. 169, 175 {1991). 
"Polygamy prosecutions were not numerous, due to the difficulty of proof," requiring as 
they did the testimony of the wife. However, Linford notes a striking similarity between the 
courts' prescription of the evidence necessary to establish these two separate Edmunds Act 
crimes. The Utah commission reported only 35 convictions for polygamy between 1875 and 
1892. REPORTS OF THE UTAH COMMISSION {Utah State Archives), cited in Orma Linford, The 
Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases, Part I, 9 UTAH L. REV. 308, 348 (1964). 
58. Hill, supra note 49, at 92. 
59. !d. at 95. 
60. !d. 
61. !d. at 97; see also Linford, supra note 58, at 349. 
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judges were strongly prejudiced against them, 62 and zealous enforcement 
of the Edmunds and Edmunds-Tucker Acts led to a distrust of federal 
authority among the Mormon population. 63 It also led to allegations of 
disproportionate sentences for Mormon polygamists in comparison to 
criminals convicted of other crimes. 64 
The memory of past injustices, real and perceived, may have 
influenced the Mormon delegates attending the constitutional convention 
to approve the inclusion of the unnecessary rigor clause. All of the 
delegates to the constitutional convention, regardless of creed, would 
have been aware of the past imprisonment of hundreds of Mormon 
62. Allegations of prejudice among judges were nothing new. In 1871, the editor of 
the Indianapolis Journal noted that the pending prosecutions for cohabitation of the Mormon 
leader Brigham Young were "conceived in folly, [and] conducted in violation of the law .... " 
5 B.H. ROBERTS, A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-
DAY SAINTS 400 (1965). 
63. Beginning in 1884, Judge Charles S. Zane "and his fellow judges began 
systematically convicting Mormon polygamists of unlawful cohabitation under the Edmunds 
Act, on evidence of community reputation. Thus began 'the raid,' a species of 'reign of terror' 
that tilled the territorial penitentiary in Sugarhouse with nearly thirteen hundred unrepentant 
polygamists and sent uncounted others on the underground within the next six years." By 1889 
"a great change ha[d] taken place ... and fair trials [were] not now unusual." Alexander, 
supra note 57, at 176, 184. 
64. Joseph Smith Black, who served three months for plural marriage in 1889, recorded 
in his diary several sentences for non-Mormons: murder- one year; manslaughter- suspended 
sentence; seduction of two women - thirty days. He compared these with sentences for 
polygamy of eight years, two years, 17 months and 10 months. Hill, supra note 49, at 94-95, 
quoting Joseph Smith Black's Diary 86 (unpublished manuscript available at Brigham Young 
University Library). Joseph Smith Black's perception of harsh sentences, however, did not 
accurately reflect the overall treatment of polygamists in 1889. There were 589 convictions 
for unlawful cohabitation up to 13 September 1888. By October 1890, there were 1300 
convictions. However, 
the increase in the number of convictions in the latter part of the Cleveland 
administration, was ... because the federal judicial appointees of the Cleveland 
administration were disposed to pass less severe sentences than their Republican 
predecessors had done; the element of mercy entered into the administration of the 
law, and men subject to trial and conviction, regarded the time as opportune to rid 
themselves of the charges against them, and came in from retirement and exile, 
pleaded guilty, and often received but half the amount of penalty hitherto inflicted 
upon violators of the law in this kind. 
6 B.H. ROBERTS, supra note 62, at 210-11. In unlawful cohabitation cases, imprisonment was 
often omitted. 
Linford notes that the penalty for unlawful cohabitation cases was "much less severe" than 
for polygamy. "The sentence for polygamy was three years and six months in prison and a 
fine of five hundred dollars; for unlawful cohabitation ... six months in prison and a fine of 
three hundred dollars." Linford, supra note 57, at 348-50 (citing United States v. Clawson, 5 
P. 689 (Utah 1885)). In contrast to Black's subjective selection of non-polygamy sentences, 
the State Board of Pardons reported parole for persons convicted between 1889 and 1895 to 
the following sentences: rape, five years; grand larceny, five years; arson, twelve years; 
burglary, two years, and forgery, one year. 1896 STATE OF UTAH PUB. Docs. 
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church leaders. 65 Several months prior to the vote on article I, section 
9, the Deseret ~ekly News published an expose of "barbarous practices" 
in the Salt Lake County Jail66 (not the penitentiary) which may have 
stirred memories at a propitious time. Based on reports from the 
wardens, the territorial legislature had petitioned Congress from time to 
time to obtain funding to improve the territorial prison. Representations 
had also been made to the United States Senate concerning the harsh 
treatment of prisoners. 67 
Heber M. Wells, who was the chairman of the Committee on the 
Preamble and Declaration of Rights and sponsored the unnecessary rigor 
clause, was the son of a prominent Mormon polygamist. 68 Perhaps not 
coincidentally, Charles R. Varian, who questioned the inclusion of the 
unnecessary rigor clause, had been in charge of the prosecution of 
polygamists from 1884-85.69 Heber Wells' role in, and motivation 
behind, the adoption of the unnecessary rigor clause is not documented. 
However, as the first governor of Utah and the president of the State 
Board of Corrections, Wells recommended an appropriation of $57,575 
for the prison, which would be used for improvements such as developing 
a better water supply, providing workshops, and improving the sew-
ers.70 Wells and those constitutional delegates who had compiled the 
territorial laws and constitutions of the previous decades were well versed 
in the prisoners' plight in the Utah Territory. Undoubtedly, this 
knowledge contributed to the early protections afforded convicts in Utah. 
D. Early Utah Laws and Constitutions 
The Constitution of the State of Deseret 1849, article VIII, section 
8, provided that "[a]ll penalties and punishments shall be in proportion 
to the offense; and all offenses before conviction, shall be bailable; except 
65. Although Roberts noted the less harsh sentences of the latter part of the Cleveland 
administration, hundreds of the Church's leading elders were still in prison in 1890. 6 B.H. 
ROBERTS, supra note 62, at 215. 
66. Prison Cruelties, 50 THE DESERET WEEKLY 437-38 (1895). 
67. Franklin D. Richards, a well known Mormon church leader, had testified in the 
Hearings of the Senate Committee on Territories on the Utah Constitution in February and 
March of 1888. 
68. Daniel H. Wells was a counselor first to Brigham Young, then to the Council of the 
Twelve Apostles. He had six wives and thirty-six children. He was arrested for cohabitation 
in 1871. He was mayor of Salt Lake City at the time. Wells was also charged with murder. 
The charge was false and Wells only spent one day as a prisoner at Camp Douglas, "where he 
was more the guest of General Morrow than his prisoner." 5 B.H. ROBERTS, supra note 62, 
at 395, 404 & n.11. 
69. Ivins, A Constitution for Utah, 25 UTAH HIST. Q. 95, 100 (1957); Alexander, supra 
note 57, at 202. 
70. Governor's Message, in 1897 STATE OF UTAH PUB. Docs. 23. 
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capital offenses, where the proof is evident, or the presumption great. "71 
This section was also part of the constitutions of 185672 and 1862.73 
In article II, section 8 of the 1856 constitution, a prohibition against 
"excessive bail" was added, but was omitted from the 1862 constitution. 
Each constitutional provision mandates that penalties and punishments are 
to be in proportion to the offense. 
In 1868, the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment extended the 
Bill of Rights so that the states were required to comply with its 
provisions. 74 Utah, seeking statehood, replaced its proportionality 
provision in 1872 with one clearly modeled after the Eighth Amendment: 
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted; nor shall witnesses be 
unreasonably detained. "75 The proportional sentencing requirement 
never reappeared in Utah's constitutions. 
The year 1872 was significant in another respect: California enacted 
three statutes which manifested its commitment to recognize prisoners' 
rights. 76 Utah adopted these three statutes in the Compiled Laws of 
1876 as follows: 
(1900.) SEC. 70. Every officer who is guilty of willful inhumanity or 
oppression toward any prisoner under his care or in his custody, is 
punishable by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or by imprison-
ment in the county jail not exceeding one year. 
(1902.) SEC. 72. Every public officer who, under color of authority, 
without lawful necessity, assaults or beats any person, is punishable by 
fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the 
county jail not exceeding one year. 
(2227.) SEC. 397. The person of a convict sentenced to imprisonment 
in the penitentiary is under the protection of the law, and any injury to 
71. The constitution of 1849 can be found in LAWS AND ORDINANCES OF THE STATE OF 
DESERET 89-90 (1851) (Reprinted 1919); Morgan, The State of Deseret, 8 UTAH HIST. Q. 67, 
162-63 (1940); ACTS, RESOLUTIONS AND MEMORIALS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE 
TERRITORY OF UTAH 44-56 (1855). 
72. The constitution of 1856 can be found in DESERET NEWS WEEKLY, April2, 1856, 
at 30. 
73. The constitution of 1862 can be found in H.R. MISC. Doc. No. 78, 37th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 1 (1862). 
74. REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES 31 (2d ed. 1878). 
75. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6. The text of the 1872 constitution can be found in H.R. 
MISC. Doc. No. 165, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1872). The unreasonable detention of witnesses 
clause was dropped from the 1882 constitution, leaving article I, § 6 reading almost verbatim 
with the Eighth Amendment. See UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6, reprinted in UTAH CONSTITUTION-
AL CONVENTION 708 (1882). 
76. See CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 147, 149, 676 (West 1988) for derivation and subsequent 
history. 
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his person, not authorized by law, is punishable in the same manner as 
if he was not convicted. 
These provisions, including the last which guarantees legal protection 
to convicts, were in force before and after the constitution of 1895, and 
were not repealed until 1973.77 The delegates to the constitutional 
convention of 1895 could draw upon nineteen years of experience with 
these statutes when they made the unnecessary rigor provision part of 
Utah's constitution. The adoption of the provision may, as in Wyo-
ming, 78 be cited to support the conclusion that the state committed itself 
to the humane treatment of its prisoners by embodying a recognition of 
prisoners' rights in its "fundamental law." At the constitutional 
convention, Heber Wells, the proposer of the unnecessary rigor 
provision, stated, "there are plenty of provisions in regard to the humane 
treatment of prisoners. "79 
As previously noted, this support from other states' statutory 
provisions was apparently insufficient to convince the delegates to adopt 
the unnecessary rigor provision. The motion to strike out was accepted 
because the proposer could cite no support from any other constitution. 80 
A change of heart apparently occurred between March 21, 1895 and 
April 3, 1895, perhaps because the proponents of the provision discov-
ered the precedential support they needed in other state constitutions. 
V. COMPARISON WITH OTHER STATES 
A. Indiana 
Article I, section 15 of the Indiana Constitution (1851) provides that 
"[n]o person, arrested or confined in jail, shall be treated with unneces-
sary rigor." This provision is the model for at least one other constitu-
tion. 81 Early Indiana documents shed little light on the framers' intent 
regarding this provision. The delegates at the Indiana constitutional 
77. The three statutes are found in II COMPILED LAWS OF UTAH §§ 4435, 4437, 4752 
(1888); REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH §§ 4141, 4143, 4504 (1898); 1907 
COMPILED LAWS §§ 4141, 4143, 4504; 1917 COMPILED LAWS 8001, 8003, 8536; 1933 
REVISED STATUTES§§ 103-26-53, 103-26-56, 103-1-38; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-28-53, 76-
28-56, 76-1-39 (1953). The three statutes were repealed by 1973 UTAH LAWS, 584-85; UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-10-1401 (1995). 
78. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
79. See remarks of Mr. Wells, supra note 2 and accompanying text. The compiler of 
the Revised Statutes of the State of Utah 1898 cross-referenced the "inhumanity" statutes with 
the unnecessary rigor provision. 
80. /d. 
81. The Oregon constitutional provision is modeled on the Indiana provision. See infra 
note 103. 
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convention of 1850 did not discuss the unnecessary rigor provision, 
though several motions were made to add provisions to the section, such 
as the right to a pretrial hearing and the necessity of indictment by a 
grand jury. These alterations were defeated and the section was passed 
as it now reads. 82 
It is useful to compare sections 15 and 16 of the Indiana Constitu-
tion. Section 16 provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required. 
Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishment 
shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of 
the offense." The unnecessary rigor section is clearly differentiated from 
the cruel and unusual punishment section, which also contains a provision 
relating to the proportionality of sentencing. Indiana case law interpret-
ing section 15 reveals a range of causes of action that excludes appeals 
against sentences. 
In the 1928 case of Hall v. State, 83 the defendant was convicted and 
sentenced to death for committing murder while engaged in a robbery. 
He asserted that the court had erroneously overruled his motion for a new 
trial. In this motion, the defendant claimed that the requirement that he 
wear shackles, handcuffs, and ankle bars prejudiced the jury against him 
and violated Indiana's unnecessary rigor section. 84 The court held that 
this section was not violated where the defendant "had secured a revolver 
and shot at the sheriff, had attempted to escape, that his codefendant had 
escaped, and that effort might be made to release the prisoner during the 
trial .... "85 
The 1931 case of Bonahoon v. State86 involved an appeal from a 
conviction of assault and battery. Bonahoon was one of two police 
officers who beat a suspect with a rubber hose to obtain a confession. In 
affirming the police officer's conviction, the court quoted the unnecessary 
rigor section and stated that the acts of the police officers "were 
indefensible and in violation of the Constitution. "87 One year later, the 
Indiana Supreme Court decided Mack v. State88 which involved an 
appeal from conviction of murder on the ground that a confession was not 
obtained voluntarily. Quoting section 15 and citing Bonahoon, the court 
82. See II REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE 
STATE OF INDIANA 1368, 1371, 1733, 2067 (1850); JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION OF THE 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF INDIANA TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION 72, 187, 353, 572, 869, 
872 (1851). 
83. 159 N.E. 420 (Ind. 1928). 
84. !d. at 423. 
85. !d. at 424. 
86. 178 N.E. 570 (Ind. 1931). 
87. !d. at 571. 
88. 180 N.E. 279 (Ind. 1932). 
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stated that "[t]he law protects persons charged with crime from ill or 
unjust treatment, and cruel and brutal methods should never be tolerat-
ed. "89 Confessions obtained through fear or force "are useless because 
they are not admissible in evidence. "90 
In Kokenes v. State, 91 decided in 1938, the appellant prevailed in 
his appeal from a robbery conviction. Appellant's motion for a new trial 
was granted when evidence was presented that he had been beaten. The 
court reasoned that "[r]esort to torture and physical punishment-utter 
lawlessness-by sworn officers of the law is shocking and intolerable. 
When such occur, the constitutional rights of the injured person have 
been invaded .... "92 
Eleven years later, Suter v. State93 involved an appeal from a 
conviction for unlawful breaking, as well as entry with intent to commit 
larceny. Admission of a confession obtained from the defendant by 
"third-degree methods"94 was held to be prejudicial error. Quoting 
section 15, the court stated that "[t]his provision applies with equal force 
to any place where the arresting officers may cause a defendant to be 
confined. It likewise applies to the period of detention prior to the filing 
of the affidavit charging the offense and the issuance and service of a 
warrant thereon. "95 
In the 1955 case of Matovina v. Hult6 damages were sought against 
police officers for false imprisonment. Hult, a suspect in a hit and run 
accident, was taken into custody at 3 p.m. on December 1, 1944. He 
was initially deprived of food and was not questioned until 2 a.m. the 
next morning. The jail was dirty and cold, and the defendant was 
threatened with a beating. The defendant asserted that "[h]e was served 
food twice a day and on occasion was served cabbage leaves floating on 
top of water. "97 The defendant was held for five days under "deplor-
able conditions" without a prompt arraignment,98 and was eventually 
released from jail on December 6, 1944. While upholding a jury award 
of $4,000,99 the Indiana Court of Appeals cited article I, section 15 as 
89. !d. at 284. 
90. !d. 
91. 13 N .E.2d 524 (Ind. 1938). 
92. !d. at 530. 
93. 88 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. 1949). 
94. !d. 
95. !d. at 391 (citing Bonahoon v. State 178 N.E. 570 (Ind. 1931)). 
96. 123 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. Ct. App. 1955). 
97. !d. at 896. 
98. !d. at 897. 
99. !d. at 898-99. 
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requiring "a prompt arraignment of persons charged with [a] crime. " 100 
The court appears to have miscited section 15, however, and probably 
intended to cite section 12 which guarantees the right to a speedy 
trial. 101 
B. Oregon 
Article I, section 13 of the Oregon Constitution provides that "[n]o 
person arrested or confined in jail shall be treated with unnecessary 
rigor." Adopted in 1857 without debate, this clause is almost identical 
to article I, section 15 of the Indiana Constitution of 1851. 102 The 
provision was first construed in 1965 by Oregon appellate courts in 
Grenfall v. Gladden. 103 Gladden petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus 
based on the alleged cruelty of prison guards. He claimed that three 
guards brutally beat him. The court held that these facts did not warrant 
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he purpose of the writ of 
habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of imprisonment and not to 
supervise administration of the institution." 104 The court stated that the 
petition failed to allege that the assault was a "routine happening" or 
"likely to recur," therefore there was no showing of a probable violation 
of the prisoner's constitutional rights. 105 
C. Tennessee 
The Tennessee Constitution of 1870, article I, section 13, provides 
that "[n]o person arrested and confined in jail shall be treated with 
unnecessary rigor. " 106 The Supreme Court of Tennessee construed this 
section in a 1965 burglary case, Sanders v. State. 107 The defendants in 
this case alleged that the taking of their clothes for several days to obtain 
soil samples for comparison with those at the burglarized building 
violated the unnecessary rigor section. One defendant alleged that a 
delay in furnishing medical treatment for a fractured leg sustained in an 
automobile accident also constituted a violation of the section. The court 
100. !d. at 897. 
101. See Owens v. State, 333 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ind. 1975). In this appeal from a 
conviction for first-degree murder there was a six-day delay between arrest and arraignment. 
Appellants contended that this violated article I, § 15. The court held that appellants had "not 
explained how the delay complained of resulted in 'unnecessary rigor,' and we do not see that 
article I, § 15 applies here." !d. at 749. 
102. See THE OREGON CONSTITUTION 28, 310, 468 (C. Carey ed., 1926). 
103. 405 P.2d 532 (Or. 1965). 
104. !d. at 534. 
105. !d. at 533-34. 
106. This section read "arrested or confined in jail" in the constitution of 1796. 
107. 392 S.W.2d 916 (Tenn. 1965). 
46 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 10 
found no unnecessary rigor. There was no allegation that other clothes 
were not furnished. The defendant was arrested at noon and the medical 
treatment was given during the early evening of that day. One defendant 
also testified that "no one had mistreated, threatened or beaten him" in 
jail. 108 
D. Georgia 
The Georgia Constitution of 1877, article I, paragraph IX provides 
that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted; nor shall any person be 
abused in being arrested, while under arrest, or in prison. " 109 In the 
1969 case of Hill v. State, 110 the defendant appealed, alleging that he 
was maltreated and abused prior to the time of trial. He claimed that the 
trial court erred in failing to protect him from cruel and unusual 
punishment. The court held that maltreatment occurring prior to 
sentencing "constituted no part of the sentences imposed as a result of the 
trial. " 111 Therefore, the prior maltreatment did not violate the cruel 
and unusual punishment provisions which "have relation to punishment 
imposed by sentences on conviction for criminal offenses." 112 The 
court concluded: "The defendant's remedy in such a case is a civil action 
against those directly responsible. Assuming that the alleged maltreat-
ment took place, it is no defense to the crimes with which defendant was 
charged." m 
E. l-\yoming 
The Wyoming Constitution of 1889, article I, section 16, provides 
that "[n]o person arrested and confined in jail shall be treated with 
unnecessary rigor. The erection of safe and comfortable prisons and 
inspection of prisons, and the humane treatment of prisoners shall be 
provided for." In 1898, this section was cited in State v. Board of 
Commissioners of Laramie County 114 to support the conclusion that 
Wyoming's fundamental law declares "that the Penal Code shall be 
founded upon the humane principles of reformation and prevention." 115 
Citing Board of Commissioners, Robert Keiter has commented that: 
108. !d. at 919. 
109. This provision is now found in GA. CONST. of 1983, art. I, § 1, para. 17. 
110. 168 S.E.2d 327 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969). 
111. !d. at 330. 
112. !d. 
113. !d. 
114. 55 P. 451 (Wyo. 1898). 
115. !d. at 459. 
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The more explicit protection available under the state constitution can 
plausibly be interpreted to provide greater individual protections than 
the eighth amendment does. For instance, it might be argued that the 
humane principles of reformation and prevention governing the penal 
code prohibit or, at least more narrowly circumscribe, capital punish-
ment than the federal Constitution does. It also appears that a 
mistreated jail detainee or prisoner could maintain a constitutional tort 
action against those responsible for his mistreatment without relying 
upon general due process claims. Furthermore, article I, section 16 
may be construed as imposing greater obligations on government 
officials respecting the maintenance of the state prisons than can be read 
into those federal constitutional provisions that have been relied upon 
in prison conditions suits. 116 
F. Summary of States' Treatment of Unnecessary Rigor 
47 
Indiana's unnecessary rigor section is separate from its cruel and 
unusual punishment section, which allows appeals against disproportion-
ate or cruel sentences. Issues of shackling a prisoner in court to his 
possible prejudice, or of forcing a confession by means of beating, 
starving or threatening the prisoner are properly brought under the 
unnecessary rigor section. Protection under this section applies to any 
locus of confinement and to the period of detention prior to formal filing 
of charges. 
Oregon's decision in Grenfell suggests that an assault on a prisoner 
by guards may only violate its constitution if it is a "routine happening" 
or "likely to recur. " 117 The Tennessee case can be used to support an 
inference that a constitutional violation occurs if a prisoner is deprived of 
medical treatment or clothes, or is threatened or beaten. The Georgia 
Court of Appeals supports the argument that maltreatment constituting a 
violation of the constitution is not a defense to the underlying crime. 
Presumably, it would be a defense if a violation led to an involuntary 
confession or prejudicial jury verdict. 
VI. REMEDIES 
One authority has noted that "[c]ourts were showing little interest in 
the conditions of prisons or the rights of prisoners until the late 
116. Robert B. Keiter, An Essay On Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, 21 LAND & 
WATER L. REV. 527, 560 (1986). 
117. Grenfell v. Gladden, 405 P.2d 532 (Or. 1965). 
48 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 10 
1960s. " 118 After section 1983 expanded civil (and prisoner) rights, 119 
federal courts fashioned relief which may be summarized as follows: 
1. Requiring administrative policy reform or enjoining administrative 
actions; 
2. Ordering improvements in institutions or institutional services; 
3. Ordering closing of all or portions of institutions; 
4. Ordering release from solitary confinement, change from trans-
ferred status, or restoration of good time; 
5. Awarding damages under Federal Civil Rights Act (and state and 
federal tort law); and 
6. Awarding of attorneys' fees in conjunction with other remedies 
described above. 120 
Arguably, the unnecessary rigor provision could be cited to claim relief 
in forms ( 1) through ( 4). 
A new trial may also be an appropriate remedy if "unnecessary 
rigor" is construed to include obtaining involuntary confessions, and 
prejudicing the jury by the manner in which the defendant is brought into 
court. Governmental immunity precludes a claim for damages against the 
state; 121 thus, a breach of the unnecessary rigor clause does not give 
rise to a state constitutional tort. 122 
A. Can relief be sought under a writ of habeas corpus? 
The meaning of the unnecessary rigor provision has never been 
clarified; therefore, Utah courts have, as Justice Durham suggested, 
followed "lock-step with their federal counterparts" in the interpretation 
of prisoners' rights under the cruel and unusual punishment provi-
sion.123 In the 1963 case Hughes v. Turner, 124 the Utah Supreme 
Court reiterated "that in the absence of cruel and unusual punishment the 
118. SHELDON KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS XVII (2d 
ed. 1981). 
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). 
120. KRANTZ, supra note 119, at 556. 
121. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 provides: "Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of ... (10) the 
incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal 
confinement. " 
122. I do not believe the unnecessary rigor provision will ever be construed as "self 
executing" in the same way as article I, section 22. Such a construction places a constitutional 
provision beyond the state's power to declare itself immune. See Colman v. Utah State Land 
Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 630 (Utah 1990). 
123. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
124. 378 P.2d 888 (Utah 1963). 
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writ [of habeas corpus] should not be used to interfere with the manage-
ment and control of internal affairs in the prison." 125 To that end it 
examined a "number of complaints" about petitioner's treatment in the 
prison, "but the court found only one complaint valid: that respondents 
had violated the provisions of Sec. 64-9-26, U.C.A. 1953 by failing to 
provide petitioner with sufficient quantity of food for his sustenance and 
comfort. " 126 The court, finding insufficient evidence that the statute 
had been violated, nullified the lower court's order granting the writ. 
The Hughes court appears to have looked first at the statutory rights of 
the prisoner, and then to the "cruel and unusual punishment" precedents. 
Prisoners have had statutorily created rights since before statehood, but 
these rights do not, and should not, be regarded as defining any and all 
rights beyond those defined by federal and state cruel and unusual 
punishment cases. 
The unnecessary rigor provision of the Utah Constitution is currently 
undefined. The Utah Supreme Court has the sole prerogative to determine 
its meaning. The court may choose whether to equate the right to be 
protected from unnecessary rigor with the protections afforded by statute. 
However, statutes change and the protection they afford is subject to the 
vagaries of different legislatures. A constitutional right is meant to be 
protected from such vagaries. Therefore, an argument may be made that 
certain conduct by prison or other custodial authorities is unconstitutional, 
even though it violates neither statute nor the cruel and unusual punish-
ment provision. The habeas corpus petition "is [the] proper vehicle to 
assail" such conduct as unconstitutional, 127 and the courts have ex-
pressed their willingness to interfere with internal prison affairs if 
conditions of confinement are unconstitutional. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The unnecessary rigor provision is an alternative basis upon which 
persons confined can seek relief from unconstitutional conduct. Two 
approaches to briefing, and thus defining, the scope of what constitutes 
unnecessary rigor are suggested. First, from a historical perspective, that 
the framers may have meant for the unnecessary rigor provision to 
protect prisoners from disproportionate sentences, as well as from 
inhumane treatment. However, the modern protections afforded by the 
Eighth Amendment and Utah's cruel and unusual punishment provision 
have rendered this argument superfluous. The Utah Supreme Court is 
125. !d. at 889. 
126. !d. at 888. 
127. Termunde v. Cook, 786 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1990). 
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unlikely to explicate the unnecessary rigor provision on a sentencing 
matter, because the court can dispose of sentencing appeals under the 
cruel and unusual punishment provision. Appellants must therefore look 
beyond those historical evils which have already been remedied by 
sentencing case law. 
Second, comparison with other state constitutions reveals that Utah's 
unnecessary rigor clause was probably adopted from Indiana. However, 
Indiana had not expounded the meaning of the clause by 1895, when it 
was adopted by Utah. This fact, and the differences of historical and 
social significance between states, usually necessitate the use of caution 
when adopting the interpretation of similar constitutional language by 
another state. Notwithstanding these restrictions, a creatively crafted 
appeal or writ of habeas corpus has the potential to expand the scope of 
the Utah Constitution and flesh out the meaning of the unnecessary rigor 
provision. In this author's view, a creatively crafted appeal will ignore 
sentencing issues and will liberally use the case law from other states. 
Given the continuing criticism of the standards used by the United States 
Supreme Court to limit prisoners' rights, the Utah Supreme Court should 
be afforded every opportunity to determine its own standards. 
